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Creation and Termination of Joint
Tenancies in Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
It has always been possible in Pennsylvania for two or more
persons to hold real or personal property as joint tenants with a right
of survivorship. 1 This form of ownership arises when parties by
express agreement establish a single interest in the property:2 each
party's interest is an undivided portion of the whole 3 and upon the
death of either party the entire estate passes to the survivor.
Joint tenancy became popular in the feudal period because it
prevented division of the services of feudal tenures. 5 But with the
demise of feudal tenures, courts began to disfavor joint tenancy., As
a result, in 1812 the Pennsylvania legislature abrogated the common
law presumption that two or more persons taking property took a
joint estate.7 The statute substituted a new presumption, which pro-
vided that when two or more persons take property, they take as
tenants in common" unless they receive it as trustees9 or as husband
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 110 (Supp. 1975); Bambaugh v. Bambaugh, 11 S.
& R. 191 (Pa. 1824).
2. Cochrane's Estate, 342 Pa. 108, 20 A.2d 305 (1941); Haggerty's Estate,
311 Pa. 503, 166 A. 580 (1933); Leach's Estate, 282 Pa. 545, 128 A. 497 (1925).
3. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES §§ 182, 184 (Tucker ed.
1965).
4. Id.; Gotthardt v. Peters, 20 Leh. 80 (Pa. C.P. 1942).
5. Strum v. Sawyer, 2 Pa. Super. 254, 255 (1896).
6. Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 432 Pa. 262, 247 A.2d 771
(1968); McVey v. Latta, 4 W.N.C. 524 (Pa. 1877).
7. Act of March 31, 1812, P.L. 259, No. 194, saved from repeal by Act of
June 30, 1972, P.L. 508, No. 164, § 3(b). This provision now appears in PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68, § 110 (Supp. 1975).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 110 (Supp. 1975) provides,
If partition be not made between joint tenants, whether they be such
as might have been compelled to make partition or not, or of whatever kind
the estates or thing holden or possessed be, the parts of those who die first
shall not accrue to the survivors, but shall descend or pass by devise, and
shall be subject to debts, charges, curtesy, or dower, or transmissible to exe-
cutors or administrators, and be considered to every other intent and pur-
pose in the same manner as if such deceased joint tenants had been tenants
in common: Provided always, that nothing in this act shall be taken to af-
fect any trust estate.
9. Id.; Philadelphia & Rdg. R.R. v. Lehigh C. & N. Co., 36 Pa. 204 (1860).
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and wife.1" If a different intent is expressed with sufficient clarity to
rebut the presumption of a tenancy in common, the joint tenancy will
be recognized." The question whether particular instruments have
expressed the requisite intent to create a joint tenancy has triggered a
great amount of litigation. The first portion of this comment explores
these cases and analyzes the nature of the estate, the statutory influ-
ence on its development, the parties who may take as joint tenants,
and the ways in which joint tenancies may be created in Pennsylvania
today. In addition, because of the joint tenancy's disfavored posi-
tion, the methods of its termination have grown in number. There-
fore, the second portion of the comment will examine the ways in
which a joint tenancy may be terminated.
II. Manner of Creation
A. Definition and Description of the Estate
Five basic characteristics are necessary to create a joint tenancy
with a right of survivorship. Four of the these are the unities of
interest, title, time, and possession. First, "[the parties] must have one
and the same interest."'12 For example, one tenant cannot receive a
reversionary interest if the others acquire a present estate.'l But the
interest held may be either a fee14 or something less than a fee."5
Second, joint tenants must have unity of title: the same grant must
create the estates of all the parties. 6 Otherwise, each tenant could
hold under a different title with each title being subject to its own
10. Madden v. Gosztonyi Say. & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 A. 624 (1938);
Parry's Estate, 188 Pa. 33, 41 A. 448 (1898); Jones v. Cable, 114 Pa. 586, 7 A. 791
(1887); Robb v. Beaver, 8 W. & S. 107 (Pa. 1844).
11. Leach's Estate, 282 Pa. 545, 549, 128 A. 497, 498 (1925); see Redemptorist
Fathers v. Lawler, 205 Pa. 24, 54 A. 487 (1903). If a different intent is expressed
with sufficient clarity to rebut the presumption of a tenancy in common, the joint
tenancy will not be prohibited.
[lit [was] not forbidden by the act, nor made illegal in any way, to cre-
ate by grant or devise an estate with the same attribute of survivorship as
joint tenancy at common law. . . . Survivorship as an incident of an estate
granted being still lawful, its creation becomes a question of intent. No
particular form of words is required further than that they shall be suffi-
cient to clearly express an intent to overcome the presumption arising from
the statute.
Id. at 26, 54 A. at 488.
12. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES § 182 (Tucker ed. 1965).
13. Klouda v. Pechousek, 414 Ill. 75, 110 N.E.2d 258 (1953).
14. Lafayette v. Brinham, 363 Pa. 360, 69 A.2d 130 (1949); Frederick v.
Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802 (1949).
15. 2 W. BLACKS'TONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES § 182 (Tucker ed. 1965).
16. Id. § 181.
declaration of invalidity that would destroy the estate. 17 Third, both
estates must arise at the same point in time.' Otherwise, the require-
ment of equal interests would be rendered meaningless in the event
that each tenant was granted an estate for the same term of years, but
one party's estate began earlier or later than the others. Last, "there
must be a unity of possession... . [E]ach has an undivided moiety
of the whole and not the whole of an undivided moiety."' 9 No tenant
holds any section of the property as his own with the right to exclude
others.20 Each has a right to possession of the whole and no party
can alienate any portion of it.2' The interests that joint tenants hold
during their lives are equal and concurrent. Even when one party
contributes the entire subject matter, the rights of each are the same.22
The most controversial feature of a joint tenancy is not the
relationship among joint tenants while both or all are living, but the
incident of survivorship---the jus accrescendi.2 s This incident causes
the interest in the whole of the property to be transferred to the
survivor not as the success of the decedent, but as a "natural and
regular consequence of the union and entirety of [the joint tenant's]
interest.
2 4
B. Statutory Influence
At common law if the four unities were present in a conveyance
to two or more persons, a joint tenancy was presumed to have been
created. This presumption was destroyed by the Act of 1812.25 This
act was challenged on constitutional grounds as an invasion of vested
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The court stated that "'[joint tenants are said to be seized per my et per tout,
by the half or moiety, and by all; that is, they each . have the entire possession, as
well of every parcel as of the whole." Id.
21. American Oil Co. v. Falconer, 136 Pa. Super. 598, 604, 8 A.2d 418, 421
(1939). See also notes 131-34 and accompanying text infra.
22. Cochrane's Estate, 342 Pa. 108, 111, 20 A.2d 305, 307 (1941). "[Tihe one
who made the contribution has by that act made an immediate gift to the other." Id.
23. Ward Estate, 73 Montg. 336, 337 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1957); see Arnold v.
Jack's Ex'rs, 24 Pa. 57 (1854); Strum v. Sawyer, 2 Pa. Super. 254 (1896); Gotthardt
v. Peters, 20 Leh. 80 (Pa. C.P. 1942).
24. Haggerty's Estate, 311 Pa. 503, 506, 166 A. 580, 581 (1933); see Pember-
ton v. Peterson, 182 Wash. 29, 36, 45 P.2d 45, 48 (1935). Traditionally the right to
the whole accrues with the conveyance by which the parties take title, rather than
upon the death of one joint tenant. This point of view has been followed by many
courts. See, e.g., Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 88-89, 174 N.W. 946, 953 (1921).
In a legal sense, [one tenant's] death does not transfer the rights that he
possessed in the property to the surviving tenants. Death does not enlarge
or change the estate. Death terminates his interest in the estate. It is
rather a falling away of the tenant from the estate than the passing of the
estate to others.
Id. But see notes 26-31 and accompanying text infra.
25. See note 7; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 110 (Supp. 1975).
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rights. The supreme court rejected the challenge and upheld the
aot in Bambaugh v. Bambaugh.26
There is no force in the argument, that the operation of the
act on existing estates, was an invasion of vested rights. Who
should be the survivor, was in contingency and in the meantime
either joint tenant might have severed the estate, by legal means,
without the consent of his companion.
27
The court held that a title that had accrued by survivorship was not
disturbed by the statute and, therefore, no vested rights were invad-
ed.2" The statute's only effect was to prevent accidental creation
of a joint tenancy with its right of survivorship, not to prevent its
creation in all circumstances.29
On the contrary, in light of the doctrine accepted in Pennsylva-
nia 'that the survivor's interest is acquired at the time he takes as a
joint tenant, 0 the Act of 1812 did indeed produce an invasion of
property rights. Therefore, the court's interpretation requires a dif-
ferent view of the time the survivor's total interest is acquired. Al-
though the court in Bambaugh did not explicitly develop a new con-
cept regarding the way in which the survivor takes his interest,
implicit in the decision is the principle that all rights incident to joint
tenancy do not vest at the time of the taking."'
C. Who May Take as Joint Tenants
According to statute a joint tenancy can result from a convey-
26. 11 S. & R. 190 (Pa. 1824).
27. Id. at 191.
28. Id. at 192.
29. Id.
30. Leach's Estate, 282 Pa. 545, 549, 128 A. 497, 498 (1925). The one-half
interest did not pass to her by succession from him, but by reason of her contract of
purchase.
31. Other courts have recognized this change more explicitly. In Bradley v.
Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 116-17, 129 N.E.2d 699, 705 (1955), the court said,
[A] blind adherence to the legal fiction that a joint tenant holds the entire
property at the date of the original conveyance, and acquires no additional
interest by virtue of the death of his cotenant . . . sanctions in effect, the
enhancement of property rights through murder. For legal fictions cannot
obscure the fact that before the . . . [death of one tenant] the murder de-
fendant, as a joint tenant, had to share the profits of the property and his
right to complete ownership, unfettered by the interests of a joint tenant,
was contingent upon surviving [him]; whereas, after . . . that contingency
was removed, and he became the sole owner of the property, no longer shar-
ing the profits with anyone nor fearing the loss of his interest. . . . We
cannot disregard these realities and apply a legal fiction. ...
But the court in Bambaugh, although adhering to the reasoning above, failed to
state the obvious conclusion that the survivor acquires certain rights upon the death
of the other joint tenant that he did not previously possess.
ance to two or more persons if the requisite intent is expressed. 2 No
express limitations exist on the persons who may take the estate.
This has generated three major problems: first, does incapacity bar
acceptance of an estate in joint tenancy; second, can the present
owner of property convey to himself and another without destroying
one or more of the four required unities; and third, can married per-
sons take an estate other than by the entireties?3"
It is well settled that a joint tenancy may be created by contract,
gift, or grant. 34 Therefore, the requirements of the creation are par-
tially determined by the manner of creation. The requisite expression
of intent will not create the estate if the conveyance fails because of
some other legal deficiency. For example, if a minor or an insane
person attempted to take property as a joint tenant by means of a
contract, the contract would be invalid and there would be no convey-
ance. 5 Nevertheless, a person lacking capacity to contract can take a
joint tenancy as recipient of a gift. There is no capacity requirement
for the acceptance of a gift, but the conveyance must comply with the
rule relating to gifts that delivery must be appropriate to the nature
of the gift. 6 This would mean manual delivery if practicable and,
if not, an "assignment, writing, or token which indicates a present
intent to pass the right of possession to the donee." 7 Consequently,
while incapacity will bar a minor or insane person from becoming a
joint tenant by contract, it is possible to create a joint tenancy in a
minor or insane person by a gift.
The second major problem concerns conveyances to oneself and
another as joint tenants. Some courts take the position that it is
impossible for one who holds title to property and wishes to convey
that property to himself and another to create a joint tenancy without
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 110 (Supp. 1975); see, e.g., In re Michael's Estate,
421 Pa. 207, 218 A.2d 338 (1966); Mardis v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13, 141 A. 629 (1928);
Leach's Estate, 282 Pa. 545, 128 A. 497 (1925); Redemptorist Fathers v. Lawler, 205
Pa. 24, 54 A. 487 (1903); Arnold v. Jack's Ex'rs, 24 Pa. 57 (1854).
33. A complete discussion of the differences between a joint tenancy and a
tenancy by the entirety is beyond the scope of this comment. See 18 P.L.E. Husband
and Wife §§ 6-12 (1961). Briefly, a tenancy by the entirety in Pennsylvania differs
from a joint tenancy in that a fifth unity, marriage, is necessary for its creation. If the
five unities are present, a tenancy by the entirety will be presumed. The estate by
entireties also differs in that it may be terminated only by joint action of husband and
wife during their lives. The tenancy in common differs from both estates in that the
property is held by several and distinct titles. All tenants, however, enjoy a unity of
possession and thus a right to occupy the undivided property.
34. Sellers' Ex'r v. McDowell, 51 Lanc. 301, 303 (Pa. C.P. 1949).
35. Dobson v. Rosini, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 537 (C.P. North. 1959); Hagopian
v. Eskandarian, 8 Bucks 28 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
36. Sellers' Ex'r v. McDowell, 51 Lanc. 301, 303 (Pa. C.P. 1949); see
Isherwood v. Springs-First Nat'l Bank, 365 Pa. 225, 74 A.2d 89 (1950).
37. Mardis v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13, 15, 141 A. 629 (1928); see Isherwood v.
Springs-First Nat'l Bank, 365 Pa. 225, 74 A.2d 89 (1950).
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the use of a straw man."8 The reason for this theory is that absent an
interim conveyance to a third party, the unities of time and title would
be violated because one of the potential joint tenants previously held
title to the property. Pennsylvania abandoned this theory in 1927 by
adopting the Uniform Interparty Agreement Act. 9 The act expressly
authorizes such conveyances of interests in real property.40
The third major question addresses the ability of married per-
sons to take an estate other than by the entirety.4' In Blease v.
Anderson42 the court recognized that with the enactment of the
Married Women's Property Act,4" the competency of the wife to take
and hold real estate as her own is just as clear as that of the
husband."44  Approximately five years after the statute's enactment
the courts decided that if it was possible for both to take in sev-
eralty outside of marriage, it should not be absolutely forbidden
after marriage. Therefore, in In re Estate of Vandergrift48 the court
38. Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Il. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928).
39. Act of May 13, 1927, P.L. 984, No. 474, § 1. This act may be found at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 541 (1965), and provides in part,
A conveyance, release, or sale may be made to, or by, two or more
persons acting jointly, and one or more, but less than all of these persons,
acting either by himself or themselves or with other persons, and a contract
may be made between such parties.
This section shall be construed as authorizing a conveyance of an inter-
est in real property (1) by either husband or wife without the joinder of
his or her spouse to husband and wife as tenants by the entireties, (2) by
husband and wife as tenants by the entireties to either husband or wife
alone, and (3) by either tenant by the entireties alone to the other without
the other joining in the deed.
40. See note 39 supra. The reasoning underlying the statute is described as
follows:
Since an estate in joint tenancy . . . differs from the estates held by tenants
in common, or that possessed by a sole owner, it would seem not illogical,
and not a departure from technical concepts, to consider that where a sole
owner conveys property to another and himself as joint tenants, . . . he is
intending to create a new estate in himself as well as in the other person,
and consequently that in such a case the unities of time and of title are
in fact present, since their title came into existence by such conveyance.
Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 587, 598 (1950).
41. In re Estate of Vandergrift, 105 Pa. Super. 293, 296, 161 A. 898, 899
(1932). It is still law that when property is conveyed to a husband and wife, an estate
by entireties is presumed created in the grantees. See note 10 supra.
42. 241 Pa. 198, 88 A. 365 (1913).
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 64 (1965), which provides in part,
Every species and description of property, whether consisting of real,
personal or mixed, which may be owned by or belong to any single woman,
shall continue to be the property of such woman, as fully after her marriage
as before; and all such property . . . which shall accrue to any married
woman . . . shall be owned, used and enjoyed by such married woman as
her own separate property. ...
44. 241 Pa. at 202, 88 A. at 366.
45. 105 Pa. Super. 293, 161 A. 898 (1932).
decided that the presumption of a tenancy by entirety would continue
to exist, but that other estates could be created by an express intent.
[A] conveyance to husband and wife granting distinctly defined
undivided parts or individual estates to each, will not be con-
strued to create an estate by entireties as against an express in-
tent of the parties that they shall take otherwise.. . , and that
a husband and wife may take and hold as tenants in common,
as individuals and not as a common law unity, if that be the
actual intent, it is still the law that where the deed to a husband
and wife discloses no intention to create any estate but one by
entireties, such an estate is created in the grantees. 46
This decision evinced a recognition by the court that married persons
retain their individuality within the marital relationship.
This discussion has demonstrated some of the problems regard-
ing the abilities of various parties to create a joint tenancy. The
method of the conveyance is inextricably related to the person convey-
ing and the persons to whom the property is conveyed. The discussion
now focuses on the ways a joint tenancy may be created by those
desiring it.
D. Methods of Creation
The right to take as joint tenants may be created expressly or
impliedly. 47 No particular form of words is required to overcome the
presumption that the transferees take as tenants in common.48 There-
fore, an examination of case law is necessary to determine precisely
what is required to rebut successfully the statutory presumption.
According to the statute, the intent of the parties as reflected in
the instrument will determine the estate to be taken.49 The courts
have construed this provision quite strictly50 and have declined to
form any firm rules concerning expressions that will or will not nec-
46. Id. at 296, 161 A. at 899.
47. Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 432 Pa. 262, 247 A.2d 771
(1968); In re Michael's Estate, 421 Pa. 207, 218 A.2d 338 (1966); Leach's Estate,
282 Pa. 545, 128 A. 497 (1925); Redemptorist Fathers v. Lawler, 205 Pa. 24, 54 A.
487 (1903); Arnold v. Jack's Ex'rs, 24 Pa. 57 (1854); Reed v. Sollenberger, 5 Cumb.
139 (Pa. C.P. 1954).
48. Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 432 Pa. 262, 247 A.2d 771
(1968); Redemptorist Fathers v. Lawler, 205 Pa. 24, 54 A. 487 (1903).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 110 (Supp. 1975); see Pennsylvania Bank & Trust
Co. v. Thompson, 432 Pa. 262, 247 A.2d 771 (1968).
50. Strum v. Sawyer, 2 Pa. Super. 254 (1896). The court continued,
The safer course is to decide each case upon its own facts, and in ac-
cordance with the principle . . . that unless the terms of the agreement ex-
pressly or by necessary implication call for a joint tenancy, a tenancy in
common will be presumed.
Id. at 256-57; see Hoffert v. Bastian, 54 Pa. D. & C. 146, 149 (C.P. Leh. 1945).
"The primary rule of interpretation of instruments is the intention of the parties
.... " This intention must be ascertained only from the language in the grant, not
from "extraneous and fortuitous circumstances." Carr v. Gallagher, 65 York 9, 10
(Pa. C.P. 1951).
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essarily suffice to overcome the statutory presumption. Notwith-
standing the court's inclination to decide each case on an ad hoc
basis, particular expressions 'have emerged that allow transferors to
express successfully an intent ,that transferees shall take as joint ten-
ants.
1. Right of Survivorship.-There is one expression that, absent
contradictory terms, has always been sufficient to convey a joint
tenancy-"right of survivorship." In construing a conveyance to two
individuals as "tenants by survivorship," the court in Gotthardt v.
Peters5 held that a joint tenancy was created.
It is a necessary implication in the use of the words 'as tenants
by survivorship' that the parties intended that the grantees
should be joint owners during their joint lives and that, upon the
death of one, his interest should cease and the entire ownership
of the demised premises should be and remain in the survivor.
52
More recently, in Zomisky v. Zomiska53 the court held that "the
use of the. . . operative words 'with the right of survivorship' makes
it clear that the intention of the parties was to create a joint tenancy
with the passage of title to the survivor upon the death of the other. '5
4
In a slightly more unusual case, a conveyance to A and B, who were
married, and C as joint tenants with a right of survivorship, and not as
tenants in common, resulted in the creation of a joint tenancy between
C and the couple composed of A and B."5 Survivorship was pre-
sumed in the estate held by A and B as husband and wife.
56  If
the intent of the transferor with respect to the third party had not
been clear, C would have taken as a tenant in common with the hus-
band and wife unit.57 Once again the court relied on the word "sur-
51. 20 Leh. 80 (Pa. C.P. 1942).
52. Id. at 82. The court further reasoned that
the courts have studied the language of the respective instruments, not to
discover a joint tenancy, but to find whether or not the whole estate de-
volved to the 'survivor.' 'Survivorship,' therefore, is the test of the extin-
guishment of a joint tenant's interest in a property. [Survivorship is] . . .
the very word which most clearly and unequivocally describes the estate the
parties intend to create.
Id. at 81-82.
53. 449 Pa. 239, 296 A.2d 722 (1972).
54. Id. at 244, 296 A.2d at 724.
55. Wally v. Lehr, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 722 (C.P. Alleg. 1954).
56. Unless a contrary intent is established, a tenancy by the entirety is
presumed in a conveyance to husband and wife. In re Estate of Vandergrift, 105 Pa.
Super. 293, 161 A. 898 (1932); see note 49 and accompanying text supra.
57. Wally v. Lehr, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 722 (C.P. Alleg. 1954); see Heatter v.
Lucas, 367 Pa. 296, 80 A.2d 749 (1951). In a transfer to A, B, and C, a conveyance
of one-third shares will be presumed. The qualitative presumption arising out of the
marital union is not strong enough to interfere with the quantitative interests apparent
vivorship" as a complete expression of the transferor's intent. The
inclusion of this term, absent contradiction, has always been ade-
quate.
2. Tenants by the Entireties.-A second way to convey a joint
tenancy is through a conveyance to tenants by the entirety. Survivor-
ship is presumed to attach to this estate whenever it is created."8 In
addition, the courts have held that survivorship attaches whenever an
intent to create an estate of tenants by the entirety is expressed, even
though the other requirements for the creation of the estate are not
fulfilled. The most common circumstance is that in which a convey-
ance is made to two or more transferees, usually a man and a
woman, 59 who are not husband and wife. 60 The tenancy by the
entirety estate fails, but courts permit the incident of survivorship to
attach and thus allow a joint tenancy to arise. In Hoffert v. Bas-
tian61 the court interpreted the inclusion of the term "tenancy by the
entirety" in the deed as showing an itent "to 'have the survivor of
the tenants take full title to the entire property without further
formality, without liability for the debts of the one first dying and
. . .free of inheritance tax." 62 The court reasoned that the expression
"tenancy by the entirety" by necessary implication expressed the
intent that the entire estate should go to the survivor upon the death
of his partner. Because a joint tenancy is the only estate permit-
ting this incident to accrue to unmarried persons, a joint tenancy was
created. 63 A tenancy by the entirety "is essentially a form of joint
on the face of the instrument. However, a double 'and' in the granting clause, i.e., to
A and B his wife and C, will indicate an intent that two units, one couple and one
single person, take the property and that each acquire a half interest.
58. Gasner v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529, 134 A. 494 (1926).
59. Maxwell v. Saylor, 359 Pa. 94, 58 A.2d 355 (1948); Thornton v. Pierce,
328 Pa. 11, 194 A. 897 (1937); Nolan Estate, 82 Pa. D. & C. 197 (Orphan's Ct. Del.
1953); DiCola v. Murr, 53 Lanc. 211 (Pa. C.P. 1952); Carr v. Gallagher, 65 York
9 (Pa. C.P. 1950); County Capital Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Cummings, 55 York 20
(Pa. C.P. 1941).
60. A discussion of the rights of a man's legal wife is beyond the scope of this
comment. For a detailed treatment of this subject see Longacre v. Hornblower &
Weeks, 83 Pa. D. & C. 259 (C.P. Phila. 1952); Comment, Pennsylvania Paramours:
Seisin and the Other Woman, 76 DIcK. L. REV. 304 (1972).
61. 54 Pa. D. & C. 146 (C.P. Leh. 1945); see Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co.
v. Thompson, 432 Pa. 262, 247 A.2d 771 (1968); Maxwell v. Saylor, 359 Pa. 94, 58
A.2d 355 (1948); Frederick v. Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802 (1949);
notes 11, 26-36 and accompanying text supra.
62. Hoffert v. Bastian, 54 Pa. D. & C. 146, 150 (C.P. Leh. 1945). Property
passing to a surviving joint tenant is subject to inheritance tax. The interest acquired
is deemed a taxable transfer of a fractional portion of the property, the fraction being
the value of the whole property divided by the number of joint tenants in existence
immediately preceding the death of the deceased joint tenant. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, § 2485-241 (1964).
63. See Maxwell v. Saylor, 359 Pa. 94, 58 A.2d 355 (1948). A man and a
woman not his wife attempted to take property as tenants by the entirety. The court
once again looked to the transferor's intent and reasoned that "although a deed under
such circumstances is ineffective to create a tenancy by the entireties it is not wholly
invalid, there being no reason why the grantees . . . cannot take title in some form of
dual ownership ...... Id. at 96, 58 A.2d at 356. The intent to create a right of
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
tenancy, modified by the common law theory that husband and wife
are one person."64
In Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co. v. Thompson 6  the court
elaborated on why a conveyance of a tenancy by the entirety to
unmarried people would create a joint tenancy with a right of survi-
vorship in the transferees. The court examined the words of the
instrument and ascertained that the transferor's intent was to convey a
tenancy by the entirety. But because brothers cannot take an estate
by entireties, the court looked to the most similar estate. The two
distinctive qualities of a tenancy by the entirety are the incident of
survivorship and the impossibility of its being reached by creditors
of either spouse66 or pledged or partitioned by one without the other's
consent.6" Because there is no other estate that restricts the ability of
one tenant to partition or alienate his interest, the court granted the
right of survivorship by declaring it a joint tenancy, rather than
"rendering [the] use of [the term] 'tenants by the entirety'
meaningless. "68 In conclusion, the court stated that "[t]he only
relevant consideration in any case is what type of tenure the parties
intended and how the law can best effectuate that intent." 69 Thus,
Pennsylvania courts have been willing to infer an intent to establish a
joint tenancy from the phrase "tenants by the entirety."
There is one situation in which courts decline to extend this
inference. When a husband and wife take property, a tenancy by
entirety presumptively results. 70 If an unmarried couple takes proper-
ty and uses the phrase "tenancy by entirety," it will be inferred that
they intended to create a right of survivorship and a joint tenancy
will result. 71 But the court will not indulge in two presumptions. If an
survivorship was implicit in the expression "tenancy by the entirety." The closest
legally permissible estate is the joint tenancy. See Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co. v.
Thompson, 432 Pa. 262, 247 A.2d 771 (1968).
64. Frederick v. Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 83, 67 A.2d 802, 805 (1949).
65. 432 Pa. 262, 247 A.2d 771 (1968).
66. American Oil Co. v. Falconer, 136 Pa. Super. 598, 8 A.2d 418 (1939).
67. Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 432 Pa. 262, 264, 247 A.2d
771, 772 (1968).
68. Id. at 265, 247 A.2d at 772.
69. Id. at 266, 247 A.2d at 772; see notes 11, 26-36 and accompanying text
supra; note 72 and accompanying text infra.
70. See note 10 supra.
71. There is only one occasion when the court will decline to infer an intent to
create a right of survivorship between unmarried persons attempting to take as tenants
by the entirety: if one grantee has not acquiesced in the deed, having had nothing to
do with its preparation or execution, a court has held that it was not his intent to
take as a joint tenant. The grantees in this circumstance take as tenants in common.
Shara v. Moss, 52 Luz. 252 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
unmarried couple takes property as husband and wife and the con-
veyance fails to state the phrase "tenancy by entirety," a court will
not presume that since they took as husband and wife, they took as
tenants by the entirety, thus allowing them to use the inference that
,they intended to create a joint tenancy."2 The grantees in this cir-
cumstance take as tenants in common."
3. Joint Tenants and Not Tenants in Common.-The simplest,
most explicit way to convey a joint tenancy is to use the expression
"as joint tenants and not as tenants in common. 7 4 The transferor is
using the very words of the statute and thereby effectively rebutting
its presumption.
4. Effect of Contradictory Terms.-None of the three expres-
sions discussed above can be successful if there are contradictory
terms in the instrument. Frequently distributive words will contradict
expressions whose apparent intention is to create an estate with a
right of survivorship. "In these cases, the . . .words 'among,' 'any,'
and 'each' are used to distinguish estates in common from joint
tenancies, and are given controlling effect in determining those estates
to be tenancies in common. ' 75 Another such distributive expression
held to create a tenancy in common is "jointly and equally."7 6 Courts
reason that if one of these terms is included in the deed, it was the
intent of the transferor to divide the property among the grantees;
only in the event of the death of a grantee before the estate vested
was the survivor to take the decedent's share as well as his own.
77
Thus, the inclusion of any contradictory terms7T in the instrument
will reinforce the statutory presumption and make it prevail over any
other intent expressed by the transferor.
In conclusion it may be noted that modem disfavor of the joint
tenancy is reflected in the fact that in over one hundred and fifty
years only three ways have developed in which to rebut the statutory
presumption of tenancies in common: by mentioning the word "sur-
vivorship," by improperly attempting to convey a tenancy by the en-
tirety, or by explicitly declaring that the parties not take as tenants in
common.7 9  Furthermore, even if the parties have otherwise suc-
72. Compare Teacher v. Kijurina, 365 Pa. 480, 76 A.2d 197 (1950), with
Maxwell v. Saylor, 359 Pa. 94, 58 A.2d 355 (1948).
73. Maxwell v. Saylor, 359 Pa. 94, 58 A.2d 355 (1948).
74. Redemptorist Fathers v. Lawler, 205 Pa. 24, 26, 54 A. 487, 488 (1903).
75. Strum v. Sawyer, 2 Pa. Super. 254, 258 (1896).
76. McVey v. Latta, 4 W.N.C. 524, 525 (Pa. 1877).
77. Id.
78. Id.; Strum v. Sawyer, 2 Pa. Super. 254 (1896). Inclusion of the words
"their heirs and assigns" as opposed to his "heirs and assigns" is not a contradiction
because these are words of limitation, not words of purchase. Maxwell v. Saylor, 359
Pa. 94, 97, 58 A.2d 355, 356 (1948).
79. The words "joint tenants," without more, are insufficient to create a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship. Howell v. Kline, 156 Pa. Super. 628, 41 A.2d 580
(1945).
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cessfully expressed an intent to take as joint tenants, the presence
in the instrument of any terms that contradict that expression will
defeat its success and the statutory presumption will prevail. 0
IIl. Severance and Termination
Modem disfavor of the joint tenancy is reflected not only in
limitations on the methods of its creation, but also in the facility with
which such interests may be severed or terminated. This facility ex-
ists primarily because there is no presumed unity of grantees in the
joint tenancy as there is in the tenancy by the entirety.8' A joint ten-
ancy is severable by the voluntary or involuntary action of any party
when the effect of that action is the destruction of any one of the
estate's constituent unities.8 2  "[W]henever or by whatever means
the jointure ceases or is severed, the right of survivorship or jus ac-
crescendi, the same instant ceases with it."'88 The parties thereafter
hold as tenants in common. 4 This nebulous rule has triggered a
80. The court held in Teacher v. Kijurina, 365 Pa. 480, 76 A.2d 197 (1950),
that bank accounts, like all personal property, are subject to the Act of 1812.
Therefore, they are potentially subject to a right of survivorship. Cochrane's Estate,
342 Pa. 108, 20 A.2d 305 (1941); Yard's Appeal, 86 Pa. 125 (1878). But because
there is no instrument of creation comparable to the real property deed and because
an account is not subject to manual delivery as would be a typical inter vivos gift,
there are special evidentiary requirements necessary to show that a bank account was
created with the intent that the survivor should take the whole. The passbook alone,
showing joint deposits, is not sufficient to create a right of survivorship. See
Isherwood v. Springs-First Nat'l Bank, 365 Pa. 225, 230, 74 A.2d 89, 92 (1950).
Neither are memoranda made by bank officers, absent any accompanying evidence
that the notations were made pursuant to the decedent's directions, sufficient evidence
to show an intent to vest a beneficial interest in the survivor. Id. In Mardis v. Steen,
293' Pa. 13, 141 A. 629 (1928), it was held that parties must, in addition to opening
the account, show an express agreement creating a joint tenancy and authorizing the
bank to deal with the survivor as the "sole and absolute owner thereof." The presence
of these two criteria was considered prima facie evidence of a joint tenancy in a bank
account. An agreement under seal, thus imparting consideration, may be additional
valuable evidence, but is not necessary because the estate may result from ei-
ther contract or gift. Bank accounts are not isolated. Rules applicable to joint
tenancies in other types of property are also pertinent. See generally Teacher v.
Kijurina, 365 Pa. 480, 76 A.2d 197 (1950). In the agreement between the parties the
same expressions may be used to rebut a presumption of a tenancy in common as are
used when real property is the subject of the transfer. Therefore, it is crucial when
establishing a joint tenancy in property of any sort to rebut clearly the statutory
presumption that the parties shall take as tenants in common through the use of
specific expressions declared sufficient to do so. For a more detailed analysis of the
legal aspects of joint bank accounts see Comment, Pennsylvania Law of Joint Bank
Accounts, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 107 (1973).
81. Vandike's Appeal, 57 Pa. 9 (1868).
82. American Oil Co. v. Falconer, 136 Pa. Super. 598, 8 A.2d 418 (1939).
83. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES § 186 (Tucker ed. 1965).
84. Id.; accord, Manias v. Yeck, 11 IlI. 2d 512, 144 N.E.2d 596 (1957);
great amount of litigation aimed at defining what acts are sufficient
to terminate or sever the estate. Because courts have ohosen to
classify acts of severance or termination as either voluntary or invol-
untary, 5 the same classification will be used here.
A. Voluntary Means of Termination
1. Partition.-The most obvious voluntary act that will sever a
joint tenancy is a request by one or all of the joint tenants to partition
the property. 6 A mere petition for partition, however, may never
result in actual partition. 7 Because the actor instituting a partition
action can discontinue it at any time prior to judgment, the filing
shows no positive, irrevocable election. 8 Therefore, courts refuse to
declare the mere pendency of an action as sufficient in itself to sever
the joint tenants' interests.8 9 This rule is not altered for the joint
tenant who dies after commencing a partition action, but before a
decree issues.8 0 Because the executor of the decedent's estate is "not
entitled to be substituted as the party plaintiff,"9' 1 death "leaves the
parties where they were at the time of [the decedent's] death, i.e.,
vested with a joint tenancy whereby the remaining or surviving ten-
ant, by operation of law, obtain[s] the deceased tenant's interest."
9 2
While some states, including Pennsylvania,"5 enacted statutes that
provided for the survival of the proceedings, the court in Sheridan v.
Lucey94 held that such statutes were inapplicable in the case of the
Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 115 A.2d 197 (1955); American Oil v. Falconer, 136
Pa. Super. 598, 8 A.2d 418 (1939).
85. American Oil Co. v. Falconer, 136 Pa. Super. 598, 8 A.2d 418 (1939).
86. See Coleman v. Coleman, 19 Pa. 100 (1852); Dana v. Jackson, 6 Pa. 234
(1847); Duffy v. Duffy, 81 Pa. D. & C. 366 (C.P. Montg. 1951).
87. Sheridan v. Lucey, 395 Pa. 306, 149 A.2d 444 (1959); Dana v. Jackson, 6
Pa. 234 (1847); Duffy v. Duffy, 81 Pa. D. &C. 366 (C.P. Montg. 1951).
88. In Sheridan v. Lucey, 395 Pa. 306, 149 A.2d 444 (1959), the court
described the necessary maturity of the action:
[A]lthough a voluntary act on the part of one of the joint tenants is ade-
quate to work a severance, that act must be of sufficient manifestation that
the actor is unable to retreat from his position of creating a severance of
the joint tenancy.
Id. at 309, 149 A.2d at 446. See also Teutenberg v. Schiller, 138 Cal. App. 2d 18, 291
P.2d 53 (1955); Dando v. Dando, 37 Cal. App. 2d 371, 99 P.2d 561 (1940); Ellison
v. Murphy, 128 Misc. 471, 219 N.Y.S. 667 (1927).
89. 4 G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERrY 1779 (4th ed. 1961); see,
e.g., Sheridan v. Lucey, 395 Pa. 306, 149 A.2d 444 (1959).
90. Sheridan v. Lucey, 395 Pa. 306, 309, 149 A.2d 444, 446 (1959); see Dando
v. Dando, 37 Cal. App. 2d 371, 99 P.2d 561 (1940).
91. 4 G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY 1779 (4th ed. 1961).
92. Sheridan v. Lucey, 395 Pa. 306, 309, 149 A.2d 444, 446 (1959).
93. This statute provides,
All causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, except actions for
slander or libel, shall survive death of the plaintiff or of the defendant or
the death of one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants.
20 PA. C.S. § 37. The constitutionality of this statute as it relates to actions for
slander and libel was addressed recently in Moyer v. Phillips, - Pa. -, 341 A.2d
441 (1975).
94. 395 Pa. 306, 149 A.2d 444 (1959).
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death of a joint tenant seeking partition. It was held that the statutes
are merely procedural and do not provide for survival if the right
being litigated is effectively terminated at death.95 By definition, in a
joint tenancy with a right of survivorship death immediately divests
the interest of the decedent. Consequently, the property of a joint
tenant whose petition for partition has not been finally adjudicated at
the time of his death will pass to the surviving joint tenants.
A certain burden of proof rests on the petitioner. Accord-
ingly, the court in Dufly v. Dully 6 held that "[plroperty held in joint
tenancy with the right of survivorship may be the subject of partition,
provided there be no valid agreement among the tenants prohibiting
it."'9 7 This agreement need not be in writing. It may be oral9s or
implied from circumstances that indicate that the parties have
given up the right to partition.99 The liberal Pennsylvania evidentiary
rules in partition contests have been accurately described as follows:
[P]artition is not always demandable of right, but, like all
equitable relief, is a matter of discretion in the chancellor; and
where a case is presented where equity would demand that par-
tition should be refused, the chancellor is authorized to dismiss
the bill .... 100
If the first requirement, the absence of an agreement not to parti-
tion, can be established, the petition will be further considered by
the court.
Partition of real property may be accomplished by the written
consent of the parties1"' or by a manifestation of prior oral con-
sent.102 Partition by the latter method is accomplished by reliance
on the real property doctrine of part performance, 10 3 the basis of
which is set out in Ebert v. Wood.1
0 4
95. Id.
96. 81 Pa. D. & C. 366 (C.P. Montg. 1951).
97. Id. at 370. See also Coleman v. Coleman, 19 Pa. 100 (1852).
98. Duffy v. Duffy, 81 Pa. D. & C. 366, 370 (C.P. Montg. 1951). "[The same
result must obtain where there . . . [has been] an express, though oral, agreement,
for it matters not what establishes the fact so long as it is competently established."
Id.
99. Id.
100. 14 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE § 18 (Rev. ed. 1965).
101. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES § 185 (Tucker ed. 1965).
If joint tenants agree to part their lands and hold them in severalty, they are no
longer joint tenants.
102. Ebert v. Wood, 1 Binn. 216 (Pa. 1807).
103. A parol agreement to separate lands is not sufficient to partition in a state
which rejects the doctrine of part performance. See, e.g., Lacy v. Overton, 9 Ky. (2
A.K. Marsh) 440 (1820).
104. 1 Binn. 216 (Pa. 1807).
[The Statute of Frauds] is considered with reference to its ob-
ject, which is to prevent frauds and perjuries; so that an agree-
ment in which there is no danger of either, Chancery has al-
ways held to be out of the Statute. 1 5
The likelihood of this danger is judged by the extent to which the
oral agreement has been carried into effect. If the purpose of the
agreement has been substantially completed, there is little room for
perjury with regard to its terms. 106 As explained by the court in
Haughabaugh v. Honald,10 '
[N]otwithstanding the Statute of Frauds [a parol agreement]
may, perhaps, still be considered valid, if the line of partition,
on the ground, be sufficiently marked, and manifested by a cor-
respondent separate and distinct possession, for a sufficient
length of time.' 08
Partition of personal property held in joint tenancy is even less
difficult. The interests may be severed merely by the action of one
joint tenant taking a portion of the property and using it for his own
benefit.0 9 Short of that, the parties' general use of the property may
evidence an intent to treat the property as held in common rather than
jointly."0 In these cases "the parties themselves . . . by mutual
understanding [convert] . . . [the estate] into a tenancy in com-
mon."'
111
Partition at will of real or personal property is a simple method
of severing the interests of joint tenants. It commonly results in a
division of the property, "but if division [is] impracticable, a sale of
the . . . [property] will be ordered with an accounting and division
of the proceeds.""11
2
2. Contract.-"[A] joint tenancy may be severed by mutual
agreement.""' Even a contract that contains provisions inconsistent
with the perpetuation of the joint tenancy, but does not explicitly
terminate the relationship, may serve as a severing device." 4 No
Pennsylvania cases directly support this theory, but the rationale of
Wardlow v. Pozzi" 5 seems appropriate to this state.
[A]n agreement between the tenants which, although it
does not expressly terminate the tenancy, is inconsistent by its
105. Id. at 218.
106. Id.
107. 3 Brev. 97 (S.C. 1812).
108. Id. at 98.
109. Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 228, 173 A. 172, 173 (1934).
110. Brodzinsky v. Pulek, 75 N.J. Super. 40, 182 A.2d 149 (1962).
111. Id. at 54, 182 A.2d at 156.
112. Rush v. Rush, 144 Misc. 489, 491, 258 N.Y.S. 913, 914 (1932).
113. In re Cotter's Will, 159 Misc. 324, 327, 287 N.Y.S. 670, 675 (Sup. Ct.
1936). See also Sibert v. Suhy, 315 Ill. App. 147, 42 N.E.2d 636 (1942).
114. See, e.g., Wardlow v. Pozzi, 170 Cal. App. 2d 208, 338 P.2d 564 (1959);
Terzyk v. Marciniak, 10 I11. 2d 529, 140 N.E.2d 692 (1957); Carson v. Ellis, 186
Kan. 112, 348 P.2d 807 (1960).
115. 170 Cal. App. 2d 208, 338 P.2d 564 (1959).
106
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terms with one or more of four essential unities of a joint ten-
ancy will also be adjudged to be a severance thereof ...
[A]ny interference with -the right of survivorship by the terms
of the agreement will f[also] sever the joint tenancy relation-
ship.
16
Because of the tendency in Pennsylvania to disfavor joint tenancies
and because the four unities as well as a clearly expressed intent that
the survivor take the decedent's interest are required in Pennsylvania
to create a joint tenancy, it is likely that an agreement in direct
conflict with the joint tenancy would be held to sever the estate.
Generally a contract among tenants for exclusive possession or
right to income will not sever joint interests. Although never ad-
dressed in Pennsylvania, Illinois courts have held that maintenance
or possession of the entire estate by one tenant with the other ten-
ant's consent is equivalent to possession or maintenance by both. 1 '
In these inter-tenant agreements the intent was not to sever must be
clear. 1 8 Holding that these contracts do not sever the estate depends
on a rather liberal construction of the requirement of unity of pos-
session. Therefore, Pennsylvania courts might find that this kind of
contract severs the parties' interests.
Contracts between joint tenants and third parties may also result
in a severance. A contract -to sell will terminate the joint tenancy.
"[W]here one joint tenant makes an agreement to convey, the joint
tenancy is thereby severed and a tenancy in common results.""19 This
occurs simply because equity regards as done that which ought to be
done. 120 "Thus, while the surviving joint tenant has legal title to the
whole . . . it is subject to the . . . [purchaser's] equitable right."'
2 1
If the sale were complete, the joint tenancy would be terminated
because the set of four unities would be destroyed. There is some
disagreement about the effect of a contract to sell when all the joint
tenants enter into the contract. Does such a contract sever the joint
tenancy or are the benefits to be received also to be held in joint
tenancy? Today most states hold that this contract will sever the
116. Id. at 210, 338 P.2d at 565.
117. Tindall v. Yeats, 392 Ill. 502, 64 N.E.2d 903 (1946).
118. Id. at 508, 64 N.E.2d at 907.
119. Manias v. Yeck, 11 Ill. 2d 512, 520, 144 N.E.2d 596, 601 (1957). A mere
contract by one joint tenant to sell his share or to settle it will effect a severance. 1 H.
TiFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 638 (3d ed. 1939).
120. Klouda v. Pechousek, 414 Ill. 75, 110 N.E.2d 258 (1953); Naiburg v.
Hendriksen, 370 Ill. 502, 19 N.E.2d 348 (1939).
121. Klouda v. Pechousek, 414 Ill. 75, 85, 110 N.E.2d 258, 265 (1953).
estate because to create a joint tenancy the intent must be expressed
in the creating instrument.'22 Therefore, without a provision in the
contract that the vendors will receive the benefits of the sale in joint
tenancy, the estate is severed. Although there is a lack of authority
in Pennsylvania on this issue, the majority theory is applicable be-
cause it reflects both the spirit and word of the Act of 1812.123
An option contract will not sever a joint tenancy unless the
option is exercised. The "mere power to sever a joint tenancy. . . is
analogous to the right of revocation which does not alter the status of
the parties. ' 124 "[U]ntil . . . the option [.is] exercised . . . no
equitable interest or estate [passes]. . . .Under these circumstances,
the [option] agreement ... would not impair any of the four unities
and would not result in a severance or termination of the joint
tenancy."' 26 Thus, "the unexercised power to sell or convey a joint
tenancy interest does not sever the joint tenancy; a consummated sale
or conveyance does.'
' 26
In sum, a contract containing explicit severance provisions or
provisions inconsistent with the continuation of the joint tenancy or
a contract to sell the interest of one or all joint tenants will sever
the estate. An unexercised option to purchase, however, will not
sever the estate, nor will a contract for exclusive possession or right
to income.
3. Course of Action.-"[A] joint tenancy may be terminated
by mutual agreement or by any conduct or course of dealing suffi-
cient to indicate that all parties have mutually treated their interests as
belonging to them in common." '127 Thus, even without a written
contract, a joint tenancy may be terminated by certain actions of the
parties. The test is whether the implication drawn from the action of
all joint tenants is sufficient to show an intent to terminate the estate.
Much litigation has arisen to determine whether divorce is sufficient
to sever the interests of joint tenants. The weight of authority holds
that it is not sufficient because "any two persons can be joint tenants.
Their relationship, so far as the property is concerned, is not changed
by the divorce. ' 128 Divorce alone, without a property settlement,
severs no unity that was present when the estate arose; nor does it
122. Joint tenancies are not favored; if not expressly created by the contract,
the law presumes the tenancy is in common. To create a joint tenancy the purpose
must be clearly expressed. Leach's Estate, 282 Pa. 545, 549, 128 A. 497, 498
(1925).
123. Id.
124. Alexander v. Boyer, 253 Md. App. 511, 523, 253 A.2d 359, 365 (1969).
125. Nichols v. Nichols, 43 Wisc. 2d 346, 352, 168 N.W.2d 876, 878 (1969).
126. Id.
127. 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 210 (3d ed. 1939); see, e.g.,
Brodinsky v. Pulek, 75 N.J. Super. 40, 182 A.2d 149 (1962).
128. Poulson v. Poulson, 145 Me. 15, 18, 70 A.2d 868, 870 (1950).
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destroy the right of survivorship in the absence of any statutory
change. 129 In contrast, conversion of property held in joint ,tenancy to
property held by a partnership will terminate the joint tenancy. 1 0 In
Pennsylvania and other states that have adopted significant portions
of the Uniform Partnership Act,"' partners hold as tenants in part-
nership. There is no right of survivorship in this estate." 2 To date,
this is the only course of action sufficient to terminate a joint tenancy.
4. Alienation.-A great variety of cases demonstrate -that perma-
nent or temporary alienation of a joint tenant's interest will sever
the estate. These situations will be discussed with a focus on the ef-
fect of such a transfer on the four requisite unities and the right
of survivorship.
It is well settled in Pennsylvania and other states that convey-
ance of a fee by one of two joint tenants will sever the estate and
convert the relationship to a tenancy in common.18 3 This voluntary
action severs the unities of interest, title, and probably possession
and, therefore, destroys the right of survivorship. If one of three or
more tenants conveys his interest, the joint tenancy is severed with
respect to that share only'34 because the unities with respect to that
share have been destroyed.13 5 But if all but one of several joint ten-
ants convey their interests, logic dictates that the entire joint tenancy
will be terminated." 6 There is some disagreement about whether a
conveyance by all of the joint tenants severs the estate or whether
the joint estate continues in the proceeds of the sale. A jurisdiction's
129. See, e.g., In re Webb, 160 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ind. 1958).
130. Williams v. Dovell, 202 Md. 351, 96 A.2d 484 (1953).
131. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1-151 (1965).
132. Id. § 72(2)(d)-(e).
133. Wisniewski v. Shimashus, 22 Ill. 2d 451, 176 N.E.2d 781 (1961); Register
of Wills v. Madine, 242 Md. 437, 219 A.2d 245 (1966); Lessee of Davidson v.
Heydon, 2 Yeates 459 (Pa. 1799); In re Estate of Coombs, 20 Beaver 178, 8 Pa.
Fiduc. Rep. 668 (Orphan's Ct. 1958).
134. Alexander v. Boyer, 352 Md. App. 511, 253 A.2d 359 (1969); In re
Cossitt's Estate, 204 App. Div. 545, 198 N.Y.S. 560 (1923); Tobolski v. Tobolski, 16
Bucks 336 (Pa. C.P. 1966); In re Estate of Coombs, 20 Beaver 178, 8 Pa. Fiduc.
Rep. 668 (Orphans' Ct. 1958).
135. If this conveyance were to pass one tenant's interest to one of the other
joint tenants, the result would be the same because the unities are destroyed regardless
of in whom the property finally vests. Each joint tenant would, therefore, remain a
joint tenant with respect to all shares not conveyed, but would become a tenant in
common with regard to the transferred share. Tobolski v. Tobolski, 16 Bucks
336, 339 (Pa. C.P. 1966); see Jackson v. O'Connell, 23 Ill. 2d 52, 177 N.E.2d 194
(1961).
136. The unities are severed here, as in a conveyance by one of two joint
tenants. See note 133 and accompanying text supra.
selection of one of these alternatives is usually based on four con-
siderations: the clearly expressed intent of the parties; the state's
policy toward joint tenancies; the party who would take the proceeds;
and the circumstances of the case.13 7 Given the general disfavor of
joint tenancies in Pennsylvania and the need for an express intent
to create a joint tenancy, it is likely that Pennsylvania courts will hold
that a sale by all of the parties severs the estate in the absence of
any express intent 'to create a joint tenancy in the proceeds. Various
state courts have upheld this theory.
138
Other types of conveyances that may sever the estate are
mortgages, -trust deeds, and assignments for the benefit of creditors.
In Lessee of Simpson v. Ammons,'3" an early Pennsylvania case, two
of three joint tenants executed a mortgage. The court held that a
severance had occurred because a mortgage in Pennsylvania"' is "an
alienation in fee to be void on a subsequent event, which is a
severance at law."'' One court speculated that a mortgage by all of
the parties will not sever the interests of the parties because "when
the mortgage is released the joint tenancy continues unimpaired.' 42
But under Pennsylvania law a mortgage by all is equivalent to a sale
by all. Therefore, some intent that no severance occur should be
expressed in the mortgage document. In all probability a trust deed,
because it involves a transfer of legal title, will also sever the es-
state,' as will an assignment for the benefit of creditors. "4 Two fur-
ther questions arise out of the nature of a conveyance. The first deals
with the situation in which the conveyance is rendered invalid
through a defect in the deed or its delivery. The same principle that
applies in the case of a pending suit to partition applies here: if a
joint tenant dies before a valid deed is delivered or before a final
partition decree has been issued, the question becomes moot. There
will be no severance because the decedent no longer has any inter-
est. The other tenant becomes owner of the whole by virtue of the
right of survivorship. 4 5 The second question concerns the effect of
a reconveyance. Once the unities have been destroyed by a convey-
ance, they cannot be reconstructed without a new instrument to rebut
successfully the statutory presumption of a tenancy in common.'
137. Register of Wills v. Madine, 242 Md. 437, 438, 219 A.2d 245, 246 (1966).
138. See, e.g., Clay Estate, 61 Berks 154 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1960).
139. 1 Binn. 175 (Pa. 1806).
140. If under state law the mortgage does not convey legal title, but creates
merely a lien or charge, no severance of the tenancy will result. See, e.g., People v.
Nagarr, 164 Cal. App. 2d 591, 330 P.2d 858 (1958).
141. Lessee of Simpson v. Ammons, 1 Binn. 175, 176 (Pa. 1806).
142. Illinois Pub. Aid Comm'n v. Stille, 14 Il1. 2d 344, 347, 153 N.E.2d 59, 62
(1958).
143. But the presumption against joint tenancies does not extend to trust estates.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 110 (Supp. 1975); note 7 and accompanying text supra.
144. Lessee of Davidson v. Heydon, 2 Yeates 459, 463 (Pa. 1799).
145. Klajbor v. Klajbor, 406 1. 513, 94 N.E.2d 502 (1950).
146. 4 G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY 318 (4th ed. 1961).
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Although a conveyance in fee will terminate a joint tenancy,
the effect of a conveyance of less than a fee on the joint tenancy
is disputed. Three theories exist. Due to the absence of Pennsylva-
nia authority on the subject, a brief look at each of these theories
is necessary to determine the one most consistent with the laws of
Pennsylvania. Klouda v. Pechousek147 expounds the most funda-
mental theory, holding that conveyance of less than a fee will termi-
nate the estate because the unity of interest is severed. 148 The trans-
feror has a reversionary interest and the remaining joint tenants
have a present right. The second theory is known as the theory of
conditional severance and it results in a suspended joint tenancy. 149
According to this theory the unity of interest is not severed, but is
merely suspended during the term of the conveyance. During the
period of suspension the parties hold as tenants in common. If the
transferor dies before the short-term conveyance ends, the tenancy in
common is final. But if the transferor survives the period of the
transfer, the unities are restored and the joint tenancy resumes. This
theory has been attacked on the ground that it ties up parcels of land
for an indeterminate amount of time with the question of to whom the
property will devolve resting "upon the chance fate of one of three
persons being the first to die." 150 Conditional severance has also been
attacked because in the event one joint tenant leases a life estate to the
other, the doctrine fails. In this circumstance the joint tenancy can
only be revived simultaneously with the death of one of the parties.' 51
This shortcoming has given rise to a third theory-partial severance.
Under this theory a conveyance by one joint tenant in fee to another
for life temporarily severs the joint tenancy for the duration of the life
estate during which the grantee and the other joint tenants become
tenants in common. If any joint tenants die prior to or simultaneously
with the termination of the life estate, those remaining take the
147. 414 Ill. 75, 110 N.E.2d 258 (1953).
148. Id.
149. For a more detailed treatment see Comment, loint Tenancy in California
Revisited: A Doctrine of Partial Severance, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 231 (1973).
150. Proponents of a theory of final severance further assert,
[T]he law of real property . . . ought to demand a severance to assure a
finality of the moment. . . . [Glood policy would . . . state that where
one of two joint tenants in fee grants his interest to a stranger for life, the
joint-tenancy, with its attendant right of survivorship, is severed once and
for all.
Note, The Severance of loint Tenancies in Fee by the Grant of a Life Estate, 20
FACULTY o L. R.Ev. 129, 130 (1962).
151. Hammond v. McArthur, 30 Cal. 2d 512, 183 P.2d 1 (1947).
reversionary interest by right of survivorship. 152 If all die before the
grantee's estate terminates, the property passes to the heirs of the last
surviving joint tenant. 5 3 Considering Pennsylvania's disfavor of joint
tenancies' and its strict construction of all of the estate's require-
ments, it is likely !that a Pennsylvania court will hold, like those of
Illinois and Maryland, '15 that even a conveyance of less than a fee
simple interest severs the estate through destruction of the requisite
unities.
Thus, a valid conveyance by all or some of the parties holding
a joint tenancy will, in most cases, be sufficient to terminate the es-
tate through severance of the interests by destruction of the four uni-
ties. In addition, a conveyance of an interest less than a fee will ter-
minate the estate because execution of a lease conveys possessory
rights, "thereby changing the nature of . . . [the] 'interest' in the
land from a present interest to a reversionary interest."' '56 In conclu-
sion, those voluntary acts of an individual that will terminate the joint
tenancy are simple and direct and demonstrate strict adherence to
common law principles.
157
B. Involuntary Means of Termination
1. Simultaneous Death.-The most obvious situation in which the
right of survivorship will be unable to vest in any party at the termi-
152. As one commentator explains,
A and B are joint tenants. When A conveys a life estate to B for B's
life, there is a theoretical division of B's estate so that he has a life estate
in the entire property, and A and B hold the reversion as joint tenants. If
B survives A, then he holds A's interest in the reversion by right of sur-
vivorship. B's interests merge to form a present estate in fee simple. If
A survives, he acquires B's interest in the reversion through survivorship
and becomes the owner of a fee simple estate.
Comment, Joint Tenancy in California Revisited: A Doctrine of Partial Severance, 61
CALIF. L. REV. 231, 234 35 nn.23 & 24 (1973).
153. Id. For a more detailed treatment of the differences between the doctrines
of partial and conditional severence, see Comment, Joint Tenancy in California
Revisited: A Doctrine of Partial Severance, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 231, 234-35 nn.23 & 24
(1973).
154. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
155. See note 148 and accompanying text supra; note 156 and accompanying
text infra.
156. Alexander v. Boyer, 253 Md. 511, 523, 253 A.2d 359, 365 (1969).
157. It is inherent in the nature of the joint tenancy that a will cannot sever the
parties' interests. The interests and rights of the parties, including those of the
survivor, accrue at the time of creation of the estate. Furthermore, the survivor takes
the entire estate at the instant of the other tenant's death. "[A joint tenant] holds
under the original grant merely; and unless the joint tenancy is severed during his life,
the jus accrecendi arises as an inevitable consequence from the nature of the estate."
Duncan v. Forrer, 6 Binn. 193, 197 (Pa. 1813). It is inherent in the nature and
purpose of a will that it shall not take effect until death.
A devise of one's share by will is no severance of the jointure for no testa-
ment takes effect until after the death of the testator, and by such death
the right of the survivor (which accrued at the original creation of the
estate, and therefore has a priority to the other) is already vested.
2 W. BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES § 186 (Tucker ed. 1965). Thus, as
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nation of the joint tenancy is that in which there is no survivor
because all or both of the joint tenants have died simultaneously. In
1972 the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute dictating the
consequences of simultaneous deaths and situations in which it is im-
possible to determine who was the last to die.
Where there is no sufficient evidence that two joint tenants or
tenants by the entirety have died otherwise than simultaneously,
the property so held shall be distributed, one-half as if one had
survived, and one-half as if the other had survived. If there
are more than two joint tenants, and all of them have so died,
the property thus distributed shall be in the proportion that one
bears to the whole number of joint tenants.' 58
Thus, the statute creates a presumption of simultaneous death that
must be successfully rebutted by the party claiming survivorship. If
survivorship cannot be proven, the property will be divided equally
among the estates of the joint tenants.
2. Slayers.-A joint tenancy also is terminated if one party dies
at the hands of the other because there is a statutory prohibition
against a slayer159 benefiting from his wrongful act.160 In addition,
another provision outlines the disposition of property when a slayer
is the survivor and unable to take his normal survivor's share:' 6 ' one-
half of the jointly held property passes to the decedent's estate upon
his death; the other half passes to his estate upon the slayer's death
unless he obtains a severance of the property or a decree granting
partition."'
decided in Duncan, a joint tenancy disqualifies a party from devising his interest be-
cause to find otherwise would be to allow a will to alter the nature of estates that
have already vested. See Hoffert v. Bastian, 54 Pa. D. & C. 146 (C.P. Leh. 1945).
158. 20 PA.C.S. § 8503.
159. "Slayer means any person who participates, either as a principle or as an
accessory before the fact, in the willful and unlawful killing of any other person." Id.
§ 8801.
160. "No slayer shall in any way acquire any property or receive any benefit as
the result of the death of the decedent." Id. § 8802.
161. This statute provides,
(a) One-half of any property held by the slayer and the decedent as
joint tenants, joint owners or joint obligees shall pass upon the death of the
decedent to his estate, and the other half shall pass to his estate upon the
death of the slayer, unless the slayer obtains a separation or severance of
the property or a decree granting partition.
(b) As to property held jointly by three or more persons, including the
slayer and the decedent, any enrichment which would have accrued to the
slayer as a result of the death of the decedent shall pass to the estate of
the decedent. If the slayer becomes the final survivor, one-half of the prop-
erty shall immediately pass to his estate upon the death of the slayer, unless
the slayer obtains a separation or severance of the property or a decree
granting partition.
Id. § 8806(a)-(b).
162. Id. §§ 8503, 8806(b).
In light of the Pennsylvania policy that a joint tenant acquires all
his rights at the time of the original conveyance, these statutes appear
to require forfeiture of a vested estate as punishment for a crime.
Courts of other states have observed that strict adherence to the
common-law notion of the time at which rights vest would mean that
the slayer's survivorship is unaffected by the way in which he becomes
the survivor. 163 Pennsylvania retains the legal fiction regarding the
time joint tenants' rights vest, but has adopted the more modem, yet
inconsistent, view of slayers' rights. In Larendon's Estate6 the court
explained that the statute does not divest the slayer of his rights, but
rather causes a technical right of survivorship to vest in the decedent's
estate to implement the legislative intent that a slayer should not
benefit from his felony. 165 This rationale involves a presumption that
absent the slaying, the decedent would have been the survivor. There-
fore, instead of abandoning one legal fiction, the court chose to
adopt another. A more logical course of action would have been to
recognize that the survivor does acquire some valuable rights upon his
partner's death that neither possessed when both were alive. This
would be particularly sensible in light of the phrasing of the goal
of the Slayers' Act-to prevent the wrongdoer from "acquiring gain"
from his crime. 166 Other states maintain the common-law theory of
the time at which rights vest, but provide for a different disposition
of the property. In Bradley v. Fox'6 7 the Supreme Court of Illinois
permitted a slayer to retain the legal interest in the entire estate as
well as one-half of the income for life. But he was required to hold
the remainder of the beneficial interest subject to a constructive trust
for the victim's heirs.' 68 Pennsylvania's statute conforms to the
equitable maxim that a wrongdoer should not benefit from his
wrongful acts, but is inconsistent with the common-law presumption
concerning the time at which rights vest. To achieve greater consist-
ency this presumption should be recognized as a fiction and aban-
doned or another means for disposing of the property, such as the
constructive trust, should be adopted.
163. In Bradley v. Fox, 7 II. 2d 106, 114, 129 N.E.2d 699, 704 (1955), the
court explained,
Those courts which hold that [the slayer] is entitled to the entire property
as surviving joint tenant predicate their conclusion on the legal fiction inci-
dent to the concept of joint tenancy, whereby each tenant is deemed to hold
the entire estate from the time of the original investiture, and reason that
the murderer acquired no additional interest by virtue of the felonious de-
struction of his joint tenant, of which he can be deprived.
See also Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950).
164. 430 Pa. 535, 266 A.2d 763 (1970).
165. Id. at 540, 266 A.2d at 766.
166. Id.
167. 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955).
168. Id. See also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188(b) (1936).
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3. Levy of Execution.-It is generally accepted that the accu-
mulation of debts alone is insufficient to sever the interests of joint
tenants.16 This is a reasonable policy since the mere incurring of
debt does not sever any of the four unities nor does it destroy
the right of survivorship. But when action on a debt proceeds to the
involuntary stage, such as levy of execution on a lien, various jurisdic-
,tions will recognize a severance to give some protection to creditors
in the event that the debtor should die. 170 Creditors should be
aware of what action is necessary to sever, for in many states if the
decedent dies without performing his obligation, the debt dies with
him. "[Tihe death of one . . . vest[s] the whole title in the survivor
free from the debts of the deceased joint tenant."' 1
To enforce his claim against the joint property of his deceased
debtor, the creditor must have proceeded far enough to destroy one
of the unities. This will sever the estate. The mere existence of a
claim, whether secured by a lien or not, is insufficient. Establishing
a lien against the debtor's property, which often accompanies the
creation of a debt, is merely a security device, does not alter title,
interest, or possession, and will not sever the estate. 172 But when the
creditor levies on the property, this seizure destroys the unities of
interest and possession' 73 and converts the joint tenancy into a iten-
ancy in common with each tenant having title to an equal share of
the property. 174 A sheriffs sale will also sever the interests. This in-
voluntary conveyance destroys the unity of title. 175 In Larendon's Es-
tate the court held that this severance will occur even at a sheriff's
sale of a slayer's interest.17 The rationale for this holding is derived
from the Slayers' Act, which preserves a slayer's right to sever or ob-
tain partition, 177 thus enabling him to convey a fee in half of the
property at a sheriff's sale following the slaying. "[T]he slayer . . .
[retains] that 'interest' which he had [before the slaying, but without
169. Hoffert v. Bastian, 54 Pa. D. & C. 146, 152 (C.P. Leh. 1945); see DeForge
v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733 (1956).
170. See notes 173-83 and accompanying text infra.
171. DeForge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 574, 76 N.W.2d 733, 737 (1956);
Hoffert v. Bastian, 54 Pa. D. & C. 146 (C.P. Leh. 1945).
172. Lessee of Davidson v. Heydon, 2 Yeates 459 (Pa. 1799). Unity of time lies
in the past and is, therefore, indestructible.
173. American Oil Co. v. Falconer, 136 Pa. Super. 598, 8 A.2d 418 (1939).
174. Larendon's Estate, 439 Pa. 535, 266 A.2d 763 (1970).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 20 PA.C.S. § 8806(a).
his] right of survivorship."'178 Although the court's position in Laren-
don has been criticized,'17 it does protect creditors. "[The slayer]
could not have prevented an involuntary severance of his interest for
the benefit of his creditors prior to the death of . . . [the victim];
that he should be able to do so by virtue of having taken [the other's]
life would be a result too anomalous to countenance."' 80 It is not un-
usual that courts decide or claim to decide on the basis of creditor's
rights, for it is this aspect of joint tenancy that has generated the
greatest amount of comment and resultant disfavor toward the es-
tate. 18' Statutory measures should be taken to provide for the sur-
vival of creditors' rights beyond the death of a joint tenant -to the
extent of the party's interest in the property. Moreover, this statute
should be applicable to personal property and bank accounts' 82 as
178. 439 Pa. at 540, 266 A.2d at 766.
179. Note, Slayers' Act-Joint Tenancy-Partition by Creditor, 9 DuQ. L, REV.
297 (1970-71).
180. Larendon's Estate, 439 Pa. 535, 542, 266 A.2d 763, 767 (1970).
181. Eshelman, Proposed Joint Tenancy Statute, 32 THE ALA. LAWYER 45
(1971); Note, Joint Tenancy: Some Thoughts on Creditors' Rights, 47 N.D. L. REV.
109 (1970).
182. While most law pertaining to joint tenancies extends to joint bank accounts
as well, there are some additional rules to be applied in order to determine if
severence has occurred. The following serves as a foundation:
When both [joint tenants] have the power to withdraw funds deposited in
a joint account, the power must be exercised in good faith for the mutual
benefit of both, and cannot be rightly exercised by the fraudulent with-
drawal of the corpus of the funds for the exclusive use of [one] and for
the purpose of depriving the other of any use thereof or title thereto.
Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 228, 173 A. 172, 173 (1934). See also In re
Estate of Carson, 431 Pa. 311, 245 A.2d 859 (1968); Lentini v. Morlando, 23
Bucks 46 (Pa. C.P. 1972). Unlike a real property joint tenancy, a conversion of
the funds to some other form does not necessarily terminate the estate through a
severance of interests. Rather, if it can be shown that the withdrawal was for mutual
benefit, the estate will continue in the new subject matter. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Beniger, 449 Pa. 373, 296 A.2d 773 (1972); In re Estate of Carson, 431 Pa. 311, 245
A.2d 859 (1968). Still, there is a presumption that withdrawal is an attempt by one to
unilaterally divest the other of his interest and that it is, therefore, an election to
terminate the joint tenancy. Mark v. Temple, 12 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 48, 55-56 (C.P.
Colum. 1961). In such a case the court will divide the proceeds of the fund equally
among the parties. Id. at 56. Although as a matter of law a mere adjudication of
incompetency and appointment of a guardian will not terminate the estate, it does
necessitate certain adjustments in the rights of the parties. Kingham Estate, 33 Pa. D.
& C.2d 699 (Orphans' Ct. Montg. 1964). Courts have not declared termination in
an effort to preserve the plans made by the joint tenants before incompetency
occurred. Misto Estate, 22 Pa. D. & C.2d 129 (Orphans' Ct. Luz. 1960). The
guardian is, however, bound to preserve the status quo of the account. Id. In order to
insure that the guardian does not withdraw frivolously, he may only withdraw those
funds that are necessary for the care and maintenance of the incompetent and those
for whom he was providing prior to the adjudication of incompetency. Kingham
Estate, 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 699 (Orphans' Ct. Montg. 1964). The account, therefore, is
only to be disturbed in the event that the incompetent does not have sufficient
additional funds for his maintenance and then only to a limited extent. The same
general rule applicable to other types of property held in joint tenancy is applicable to
bank accounts: when withdrawal severs the unities of interest and possession, it will
sever the estate; but incompetency alone will not sever because it does not alter the
requisite unities. For a more detailed treatment see Comment, Pennsylvania Law of
Joint Bank Accounts, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 107 (1973).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
well as real property. This measure will assure the validity and
enforceability of liens that have attached to the decedent's share and it
might diminish the disfavor toward joint tenancy.
IV. Conclusion
The disfavor of the joint tenancy is reflected in the lack of
clarity, specificity, and consistency in applicable law. It is suggested
that certain statutory changes can remedy the legal inadequacies that
create the disfavor of the estate. First, the common-law notion that
all rights of joint tenants vest at the time of the original conveyance
should be abandoned. This fiction can be reconciled with neither the
judicial explanation of the constitutionality of the Act of 18121s1 nor
the Slayers' Act.' In the interest of reality as well as consistency,
this theory should be recognized for the fiction it is. Next, the legis-
lature should establish a form for the creation of a joint tenancy. The
rule that a clear intent is necessary to create this estate has caused
much litigation -that could have been eliminated by enactment of
some statutory rule. This would probably produce no major change
in the state of the law. Courts have tended to judge intent by the
form of words used despite the policy that no particular form of
words is required. Finally, there should be some statutory extension
of creditors' rights so that valid claims against a joint tenant's estate
do not die with him in the absence of attachment, but survive to the
extent of the interest he had while alive. These changes will make
the joint tenancy a more popular form of ownership by destroying
the doubt that surrounds its attempted creation, by providing assur-
ances to creditors, and by providing an alternative for married per-
sons who desire the right of survivorship inherent in tenancy by the
entirety, but who favor a greater variety of means of severance.
PATRICIA HEDLEY JENKINS
183. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 110 (Supp. 1975).
184. Id. tit. 20, §§ 8802, 8806 (1972). Although not considered in cases con-
cerning joint tenancies, the common-law fiction is also inconsistent with the levying
of inheritance tax on the portion of property passing to survivors. See note 62 supra.
